Reexamining the Impact of nuclear weapons on Deterrence with an Emphasis on Verse 60 of Surah Al-Anfal

In the present century, nuclear weapons have become one of the most pivotal factors influencing global security, strategic, and political equations. From the very beginning of their production, these weapons were not merely considered military tools; rather, due to their unprecedented destructive power and extensive geopolitical consequences, they have been able to affect the structure of many theories and models of international relations. The United States' use of two nuclear bombs against Japan during World War II was a fateful moment in world military history, which not only hastened the end of the war but also demonstrated for the first time that nuclear weapons could become a decisive instrument
in international politics. Subsequently, the discourse surrounding the production, accumulation, transfer, and even the threat of using these weapons expanded, and during the Cold War, a pervasive competition took shape between the two power blocs. In this era, nuclear weapons became not just a military tool, but a symbol of superiority, deterrence, national power, and even the political identity of nations. Concurrently with the expansion of this competition, debates emerged in some Muslim societies about whether religious concepts could serve as a foundation for acquiring various types of defensive power. One of the most significant verses cited is Verse 60 of Surah Al-Anfal, which calls upon Muslims to prepare whatever force they can to instill fear (irhāb) into the hearts of enemies. Some experts have interpreted this general concept of power (quwwah) as encompassing any type of deterrent capability and have sought to examine the relationship between it and modern weapons, including nuclear arms. This research has been formed precisely with the same objective: to clarify whether, according to the provisions of this noble verse and considering its defensive aims, the production of nuclear weapons can be considered a religious obligation (wājib) or not, and whether the scope of the verse includes such tools. The research method is descriptive-analytical, and its data have been extracted from authoritative library sources, including exegeses of the Holy Quran, jurisprudential works, security analyses, strategic studies, and research related to deterrence theory. In the first step, the history of the emergence of nuclear weapons, their development process, and their role in shaping defense doctrines were examined to clarify what impact the specific characteristics of these weapons have had on security calculations. Subsequently, the concept of deterrence in military thought, from classical perspectives to modern theories, was analyzed, and its relationship with arms races and the reciprocal reactions of powers was investigated. In the next stage, Verse 60 of Surah Al-Anfal was systematically and methodically examined from lexical, exegetical, and jurisprudential perspectives, and the opinions of contemporary jurists regarding the scope of the obligation of defensive preparedness were analyzed. This examination included studying the extent to which the concept of "quwwah" (power/force) encompasses various types of defensive tools, the criteria for obligation (wujūb), the role of certainty (qaṭʿ) versus uncertainty in the realization of a ruling, and how to assess public interest (maṣlaḥah) in emergent issues. The research method has been based on conceptual analysis, uṣūlī inference, evaluation of transmitted (naqlī) and rational (ʿaqlī) proofs, and assessing the relationship between religious rulings and security requirements. Thus, efforts have been made to ensure that interpretations are grounded in the principles of jurisprudence, not merely speculative
or political conjecture. The research results indicate that although Verse 60 of Surah
Al-Anfal recommends that Muslims acquire power and defensive preparedness, this recommendation is not absolute and unconditional. The main objective of the verse is to create genuine deterrence against the enemy — deterrence that is based on certainty or at least rational assurance (iṭmiʾnān ʿaqlāʾī). In studies conducted on deterrence theories in international relations, it became clear that, contrary to popular belief, the possession of nuclear weapons has not always reduced the likelihood of war or strengthened deterrence; because an increase in one side's power typically leads to an increase in the other side's power as well, resulting in an arms race, tension, and instability. Therefore, deterrence arising from nuclear weapons is not only non-certain but also, in many cases, relative, fragile, and dependent on reciprocal reactions. This very uncertainty prevents the generalization of the ruling of "obligation" to such a matter. From the perspective of uṣūl al-fiqh, it has also become clear that "obligation" requires definitive proof, and conjecture (ẓann), speculation, and probability are insufficient to establish it. If there is a probability of deterrence but certainty is not achieved, a binding ruling cannot be issued based on the verse. The research shows that one can claim that producing nuclear weapons is obligatory only if it is conclusively proven that this production directly and without alternative prevents enemy aggression. However, since nuclear weapons invariably create reciprocal reactions and competition, such certainty is difficult and sometimes impossible in practice. Therefore, based on jurisprudential and security analyses, the probability of deterrence cannot serve as the basis for inferring a ruling of obligation. The present research has shown that the position of nuclear weapons in the international system is complex, multidimensional, and affected by the reciprocal reactions of powers. Although these weapons possess destructive power and geostrategic influence, the deterrence theory based on them faces serious limitations and cannot always guarantee sustainable security. On the other hand, the exegetical examination of Verse 60 of Surah Al-Anfal indicates that although the concept of "quwwah" in the verse is general and broad, this breadth does not mean the obligation to produce every type of military tool. The main condition for obligation is the realization of certain deterrence and effective defense. Accordingly, in situations where the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons is merely probable and not certain, relying on the verse to prove the obligation of their production is not possible. For this reason, the religious understanding of the concept of preparedness and power must be based on certain criteria, the real interests (maṣāliḥ) of society, and precise security analyses. This research can serve as a step toward clarifying the relationship between religion, security, and emerging developments, and contribute to the development of theoretical literature in the field of defense policy and contemporary jurisprudence