تحلیل نظری بر بحران‎های اجتماعی در ایران 1404-1396؛ ریشه‌ها و راهکارهای گذار

The present study examines one of the most complex periods in the history of Iran’s political and social life, namely, the period from 2017 to 2025. This period has been marked by “accumulated crises” in Iranian society—crises that have not resulted from any single factor, but rather from the intersection of rigid economic structures, international pressures and sanctions, and fundamental changes in the perceptions and demands of younger generations. The article’s central concern is the examination of the gap between the “pace and volume of social demands” and the “capacity of political institutions to respond.” The main research question is: What were the manifestations of the social crises during this period, and what institutional mechanisms are needed to move beyond this state of limbo? To explain this situation, the authors draw on Samuel Huntington’s theory, as developed in Political Order in Changing Societies. The core of this approach is the relationship between the level of social participation and the strength of political institutions. From Huntington’s perspective, a crisis occurs when social mobilization and the pressures arising from modernization develop at a pace and intensity that exceed the capacity of the prevailing institutions and bureaucracy to build institutions. In this article, political institutionalization is assessed using four key indicators. The first is adaptability: the capacity of the political structure to accommodate new demands and respond flexibly to environmental changes. The second is complexity: the degree of specialization and functional differentiation within government organizations. The third is autonomy: the degree to which decision-making institutions are independent of pressure from influential groups or particular interests. The fourth is coherence: the degree of internal coordination and integration within the governing system. We argue that the emergence of crises in Iran during this period was directly attributable to the mismatch between these indicators and the growing demands of a society rapidly moving away from traditional patterns of participation. The article attributes the crises of 2017–2025 to a combination of domestic and transnational factors. The domestic factors are as follows. First, economic disparities and relative deprivation: chronic inflation, a sharp decline in the middle class’s purchasing power, and distributive inequalities have fostered a sense of “relative deprivation.” When a large segment of society feels that conventional avenues of social mobility have been blocked and the ladder of economic advancement has broken, protests cease to be merely sectoral and take on a structural character. Second, network society and changes in communicative action: the expansion of communication technologies and social networks has shifted communication patterns from a “vertical” model (state to society) to a “horizontal” one (society to society). As a result, official state narratives are no longer the sole source of interpretations of reality, and social actors can organize rapidly. Third, the emergence of new actors: women and younger generations (Generation Z and Generation Alpha) have emerged as driving forces of social change. Their demands are no longer exclusively economic but also encompass identity, lifestyle, and the right to participate in determining their own future. These groups are difficult for the traditional bureaucratic structure to understand and accommodate. The most significant transnational factor is international sanctions. Although sanctions are not the sole cause of the crises, they have acted as a “catalyst” or accelerator. By constraining the state’s financial resources, they have substantially reduced its capacity to “distribute resources”—a traditional means of securing legitimacy or managing crises. The study’s findings indicate that the government’s response to these crises has remained largely “security-oriented.” While society is moving through the stages of modernization and demanding civic participation, political institutions remain bound by mechanisms of “limited access.” This gap has left formal institutions responding to crises through inaction or confrontation rather than resolution, thereby exacerbating them. The article emphasizes that the social crises of this period can no longer be contained through classical instruments, as the problem has shifted from a “crisis of management” to a “crisis of institutional effectiveness and legitimacy.” In its concluding section, the article argues that moving beyond this situation requires a fundamental change in the model of governance. To break this cycle of instability, it proposes the following measures. First, a shift from a security-oriented to a reform-oriented approach: the governing authorities must recognize that “political order” is not secured through “closure,” but rather through the “institutionalization of participation.” Second, reopening channels of participation: establishing genuine legal avenues for social forces—particularly women and young people—to participate in decision-making processes, rather than ignoring or excluding them. Third, an effective, society-oriented bureaucracy: economic and administrative institutions must be rebuilt to reduce rent-seeking and corruption and ensure a fairer redistribution of resources, thereby alleviating the harms caused by relative deprivation. Accordingly, mechanisms for addressing generational, identity-based, social, and other challenges include adopting communitarian economic and political approaches, moving beyond a limited-access political system dominated by an oligarchy, and recognizing women and young people as emerging social forces. Ultimately, the article warns that the continuation of the current situation and insistence on traditional models of governance could erode institutional capacity and eventually lead to deeper instability. A successful transition requires “structural renewal” and recognition of “society as an active agent.” This entails a shift in the state’s role from “exercising authority” toward “facilitation and participatory governance.”