نسبت برابری و عدالت سیاسی

In the intellectual and normative framework of political societies, a set of values serves as fundamental organizing principles of collective life. Concepts such as freedom, justice, and equality are among the most important values at the heart of political philosophy debates. While the intrinsic value and independence of concepts like freedom and justice are generally accepted, the position and nature of "equality" as a social value has always been a subject of controversy and ambiguity. This article provides an analytical and in-depth examination of the relationship between two key concepts, "equality" and "political justice," and seeks to answer the central question: Is equality inherently and independently an absolute social value, or is its worth always contingent upon the realization of justice and dependent on it? In other words, are there independent and compelling reasons for the intrinsic value of equality that make it unnecessary to be linked with the notion of justice, allowing it to perform its own specific mandatory functions in organizing social order? This study, adopting a descriptive-analytical approach and examining various arguments, tests the hypothesis that equality, unlike values such as freedom and justice, is not an absolute and primary social value; rather, it is a secondary value that derives its worth and binding nature from justice. The findings of the research indicate that "equality," by itself and without considering its object or subject, lacks axiological and guiding power. For example, subjecting everyone to slavery equally or honoring everyone equally are both instances of applying the principle of equality, yet the moral value of these actions does not stem from equality itself but from the nature of their subjects (slavery or honor). Therefore, equality only becomes valuable and binding when it serves the realization of another, prior value, especially justice. In other words, the application of equality is desirable when it is "just," and the application of inequality is undesirable when it constitutes "injustice." This inseparable link places equality under the conceptual umbrella of justice, denying its independence as a fundamental value.The article then analyzes the concept of "the intrinsic equality of humans" and its implications. While both Islamic and modern thought emphasize that all humans are equal in terms of dignity and intrinsic human value, this inherent equality cannot automatically be extended to necessitate equality in all acquisitive domains. Individual differences in talent, effort, skill, and choices naturally lead to legitimate and just inequalities in social and economic spheres. Ignoring these acquired differences and attempting to create absolute equality is not only impossible but also constitutes an instance of injustice, as it conflicts with individuals' rights, entitlements, and merits. The intrinsic equality of humans can only serve as a foundation for rejecting any discrimination and inequality based on natural distinctions (such as race, color, or ethnicity); however, it cannot be used as a criterion for distributing all societal benefits and goods. In the final section, the article explains the specific functions of the principle of equality within the framework of "political justice." In this domain, equality manifests in various forms: (1) equality before the law, meaning the impartial enforcement of laws for all individuals; (2) equality in political opportunities, meaning the creation of a fair competition environment for all deserving individuals to assume positions. In these instances, equality functions not as an ultimate goal, but as a tool for achieving distributive and procedural justice. Political justice also requires addressing unjust inequalities arising from the influence of economic and social powers, which can lead to the violation of citizens' rights and political corruption. Ultimately, by challenging the notion of absolute egalitarianism, the article concludes that equality in the political sphere should be conceptualized and applied within the complex framework of political justice, taking into account legitimate acquisitive differences. Any abstract analysis of equality, without reference to justice, will be ineffective and misleading.