موانع صلح و عوامل جنگ در خاورمیانه: یک رویکرد نئو رئالیستی

Peace in the Middle East—a profoundly complex issue—has fundamentally been
a function of a realist and negative definition of the concept. This construal of peace may be considered a shared understanding across various strands of realism. In relation to
the Middle East, this approach adopts a structural perspective, viewing the region as a subsystem of the international system. Accordingly, shifts in the overarching structure
of the global order directly influence war and peace at the regional level. Against this backdrop, the primary question is: From a neorealist perspective, what are the most critical obstacles to peace in the Middle East? One might argue that, at the subnational unit level of analysis, irrational actor behavior, the absence of systemic balance, and uneven capability distribution operate in ways that perpetuate instability. Moreover, the Middle East’s geopolitical and strategic significance has invited interventionist actors, significantly disrupting regional equilibrium. This occurs even as extraregional powers’ reluctance
to engage in regional issues could otherwise compel local actors to resolve conflicts themselves. Employing a descriptive-analytical approach based on documentary data collection, this study meticulously examines the barriers to achieving peace in the Middle East. Focusing on a negative definition of peace, it analyzes these obstacles through neorealism and proposes solutions—within the framework of the theory—for attaining minimal peace in the region. The first variable that might obstruct peace is the emergence of subnational actors in political agency. Contrary to neorealism’s primary focus on states, these actors have played a pivotal role in regional politics, particularly over the past two decades. The nature of state–substate relations has, in practice, rendered behavioral predictability in the Middle East exceedingly difficult, as subnational actors are largely beyond oversight and control. The second critical variable is irrational agency. In neorealist terms, a rational actor is one who identifies the structure and direction of power and aligns behavior accordingly, while calculating interests in terms of material cost-benefit analysis. This leaves little room for ideological approaches; indeed, geopolitics predominates over ideology. Thus, as long as intensely ideological agency persists in the region, achieving peace in its positive sense remains highly improbable. Another factor is the presence of interventionist actors and the lack of systemic balance. The Middle East constitutes a centripetal security complex that, due to its geopolitical and geoeconomic allure, draws major extraregional powers. Meanwhile, regional actors have increasingly recognized that—given domestic fragility and volatile regional dynamics—they must align with powerful external players. This behavior prevents the regional power structure from naturally gravitating toward equilibrium, resulting in persistent instability and fluctuation around specific poles of power, sustained by great-power backing. Consequently, these interventionist actors themselves generate instability, or their support for regional powers fosters aggressive behavior. In conclusion, Middle Eastern states must acknowledge that as long as interventionist actors disrupt the balance of power, subnational actors wield significant influence, and agency fails to adhere to neorealist rationality—defined by material cost-benefit calculation—the prospect of achieving peace in its positive sense will remain exceedingly remote.